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Abstract
In certain electricity markets, because of non-convexities that arise from their oper-
ating characteristics, generators that follow the independent system operator’s (ISO’s)
decisions may fail to recover their cost through sales of energy at locational marginal
prices. The ISO makes discriminatory side payments to incentivize the compliance of
generators. Convex hull pricing is a uniform pricing scheme that minimizes these side
payments. The Lagrangian dual problem of the unit commitment problem has been
solved in the dual space to determine convex hull prices. However, this approach is
computationally expensive. We propose a polynomially-solvable primal formulation for
the Lagrangian dual problem. This formulation explicitly describes for each generat-
ing unit the convex hull of its feasible set and the convex envelope of its cost function.
We cast our formulation as a second-order cone program when the cost functions are
quadratic, and a linear program when the cost functions are piecewise linear. A 96-
period 76-unit transmission-constrained example is solved in less than fifteen seconds
on a personal computer.
1 Introduction
Day-ahead and some real-time electricity markets in the US currently base their market
clearing model on a unit commitment and economic dispatch (UCED) problem [1–3]. The
independent system operator (ISO) sends energy prices and target quantity instructions to
each generating unit (called “unit” for short hereafter) based on a welfare-maximizing solu-
tion to the UCED problem. Ideally, energy prices provide incentives for profit-maximizing
market participants to comply with the ISO’s commitment and dispatch decisions. Various
issues prevent this ideal, however, including the non-convexities in the market that arise
from units’ operating characteristics. Consequently, start-up and no-load costs of units may
not be covered by sales of energy at locational marginal prices (LMPs). More generally,
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in a market with non-convexities, there might be no set of uniform prices1 that supports a
welfare-maximizing solution [4].2
One way to address this problem is to maintain uniform energy prices based on marginal
energy costs and provide side payments to units that have an incentive to deviate from the
ISO’s solution. This side payment is also known as an “uplift” payment. In principle, the
amount of uplift payment to a unit should cover its lost opportunity cost, the gap between its
maximum possible profit and the actual profit obtained by following the ISO’s solution. For
example, the cost of a fast-start unit dispatched at its minimum limit may not be covered
by sales of energy at its marginal cost. If revenues are based solely on LMP, then the profit-
maximizing decision of this unit is to shut down. An uplift payment is needed to keep this
unit online [5]. Unlike energy prices, uplift payments are non-uniform (discriminatory) in
that the amount of payment is unit-specific. These side payments make it harder for a
potential entrant to determine if new entry would be profitable, particularly if the uplift
payments are not disclosed publicly.
Transparency of the market can be improved by keeping uplift payments as low as pos-
sible. To this end, several alternative pricing schemes have been proposed. For example,
an ad-hoc method to reduce uplift payments to fast-start units is to relax their minimum
generation limits to zero, so that they can set the LMPs [6]. Keeping marginal prices as
uniform energy prices, the pricing scheme proposed in [7] introduces artificial constraints
that set the commitment variables at a welfare-maximizing solution and create discrimina-
tory side payments for commitment decisions based on the optimal dual variables associated
with these artificial constraints. Different from the pricing schemes that aim at supporting
a welfare-maximizing solution, pricing schemes such as [8] have been proposed to incentivize
a commitment and dispatch solution that is close, but not necessarily equal to the ISO’s
welfare-maximizing solution. In these methods, allocative efficiency is traded off against
transparency. Instead of focusing on unit-commitment based markets that are typical in
the US, Ortner and Huppmann [9] define a quasi-equilibrium for a self-committed electric-
ity market, and determine prices through a mathematical program with equilibrium con-
straints. See [10] for a comprehensive review of different pricing schemes for markets with
non-convexities.
Convex hull pricing [4,11,12] is a pricing scheme that minimizes certain uplift payments
over all possible uniform prices, and has received much attention. The Midcontinent ISO
(MISO) has implemented an approximation of convex hull pricing, and refers to convex hull
prices as extended locational marginal prices (ELMPs) [5]. Convex hull prices are slopes of
the convex envelope of the system cost function,3 and are thus non-decreasing with respect to
demand. These prices minimize the total uplift payment defined by the duality gap between
1A uniform price is a single price that applies to all transactions at a given bus. Prices may vary
locationally.
2A set of prices is said to support a solution if the economic agents’ profit maximizing decisions align
with this solution.
3More precisely, they are sub-gradients of the convex envelope of the system cost function. The system
cost function here is the value function of the UCED problem parametrized by demand. The convex envelope
of a function is the largest convex under-estimator of the given function.
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the UCED problem and its Lagrangian dual.
The Lagrangian dual problem of the UCED problem in which the system-wide constraints
are dualized has been used to determine convex hull prices. This problem is convex but
non-smooth. Algorithms such as sub-gradient methods, bundle methods [13], and cutting
plane methods [14] have been proposed to solve the Lagrangian dual problem of mixed-
integer programming problems. In the context of convex hull pricing, the focus is on the
optimality of dual variables, rather than obtaining primal solutions. Therefore, in addition
to general-purpose methods, an outer approximation method [4], a sub-gradient simplex
cutting plane method [15], and an extreme-point sub-differential method [16] have been
designed specifically for convex hull pricing.
None of the above-mentioned methods guarantees convergence in polynomial time. For
non-smooth optimization techniques like the sub-gradient method for which no certificate of
optimality exists, the algorithm is often terminated before an optimal value is attained [17,
Chapter 10.3]. Obtaining exact dual maximizers of the Lagrangian dual problem is compu-
tationally expensive [5, 18]. Consequently, MISO implements a single-period approximation
of convex hull pricing that is based on a version of the UCED problem in which integer
variables are relaxed to being continuous [5].
Efficient computation of convex hull prices remains challenging. This paper proposes a
polynomially-solvable formulation for convex hull pricing. Section 2 introduces convex hull
pricing. Section 3 presents a primal formulation of the Lagrangian dual problem of the
UCED problem. In this formulation, we explicitly describe convex hulls of individual unit’s
feasible commitment and dispatch decisions and convex envelopes of individual cost func-
tions. We cast the primal formulation as a second-order cone program if the cost functions
are quadratic, and a linear program if the cost functions are affine or piecewise linear. Our
formulation gives exact convex hull prices in the absence of ramping constraints.
Section 4 considers several extensions to our model. We show that exact convex hull
prices can still be obtained when ancillary services or any linear system-wide constraints
(such as the transmission constraints) are introduced. Ramping constraints lead to an ex-
ponential number of valid inequalities in the convex hull representation. In this case, we
approximate the convex hulls using valid inequalities developed in [19, 20]. Since only a
linearly-constrained convex program needs to be solved to obtain convex hull prices, our
approach is robust and scalable. Section 5 reports numerical tests conducted on several
examples found in the literature, and conclusions follow in Section 6.
2 Convex Hull Pricing
This section formulates a unit commitment and economic dispatch (UCED) problem. We
refer to coupling constraints that enforce system-wide requirements (e.g., demand and trans-
mission constraints) as system-wide constraints. In contrast, constraints that an individual
unit faces are called private constraints.
We first consider a UCED problem in which the only type of system-wide constraint is
supply-demand balance constraint. We define the uplift payment to a unit to be its lost
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opportunity cost. We then introduce the concept of convex hull pricing and describe the
Lagrangian dual problem of the UCED problem. This simple model suffices to illustrate the
basic ideas of convex hull pricing and our primal formulation.
2.1 The UCED Problem
We consider a T -period offer-based UCED problem with |G| units. For unit g ∈ G at time
t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, the commitment variable xgt is 1 if the unit is online and is 0 if the unit is
offline. The start-up variable ugt is 1 if unit g starts up at period t and is 0 otherwise.
Denote unit g’s dispatch-level (dispatched power output) vector by pg ∈ RT+, whose t-th
component is the dispatch level at time t. Similarly, xg ∈ {0, 1}T denotes the commitment
vector, and ug ∈ {0, 1}T−1 is the start-up vector.4 Let unit g’s offer cost function be
Cg(pg,xg,ug), which may include energy, start-up, and no-load costs. As in [21, 22], we
assume that Cg is convex piecewise linear or convex quadratic in pg. We assume that the
start-up and no-load costs are constant. Let Xg ⊆ RT+ × {0, 1}T × {0, 1}T−1 be the set of
feasible commitment and dispatch decisions for unit g. We assume that private constraints
that define Xg are specified by linear inequalities; these constraints may include generation
limits, minimum up/down time, and perhaps ramping constraints [21].
Let d ∈ RT+ be a demand vector, whose t-th component denotes system demand at time
t. The UCED problem makes a set of commitment and dispatch decisions that minimizes
the total cost, while satisfying physical and operational constraints:
v(d) = min
pg,xg,ug, g∈G
∑
g∈G
Cg(pg,xg,ug) (1)
s.t.
∑
g∈G
pg = d (2)
(pg,xg,ug) ∈ Xg ∀g ∈ G. (3)
In addition, we view the UCED problem as parametrized by the demand vector d, and
denote the value function of the UCED problem by v(d).
2.2 Non-convexity and Uplift Payments
Suppose that an energy price vector pi is specified by the independent system operator (ISO).
Assume that unit g is a price-taker.5 Its profit maximization problem is:
wg(pi) = max
pg,xg,ug
pi⊺pg − Cg(pg,xg,ug) (4)
s.t. (pg,xg,ug) ∈ Xg, (5)
where wg(pi) is the value function of this problem.
4The start-up variables ug are defined from period 2 to T . For simplicity we do not consider the initial
conditions of the units. Our formulation can be extended to consider these conditions.
5We assume that the units are prices takers in the economic sense that they cannot affect prices.
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From a microeconomic viewpoint, the ISO’s UCED problem (1)–(3) is a social planner’s
problem whose solution is welfare-maximizing. Problem (4)–(5) is the profit maximization
problem of a rational agent. If the ISO’s problem is convex and satisfies strong duality, we can
set pi to be the optimal dual vector associated with the supply-demand balance constraints
in the planner’s problem. As a result, there exist individual profit-maximizing decisions that
align with the welfare-maximizing solution, but the ISO may need to specify which solution
is welfare maximizing. If the ISO’s problem were strictly convex, then prices alone would
provide sufficient information for the units to determine an efficient decision [23, Chapter
16].
However, the UCED problem is non-convex because of the integer decision variables
xg and ug. Thus, in general, there does not exist a set of prices that support the ISO’s
decisions. In particular, revenues from locational marginal prices (LMPs) may not cover
the offered costs of a unit, and the unit may prefer to deviate from the ISO’s commitment
and dispatch decisions, unless there is additional incentive to follow those decisions. LMPs
are determined as the optimal dual variables associated with the supply-demand balance
constraints in a continuous convex economic dispatch problem with commitment decisions
fixed at ISO-determined optimal values.
One way to address the above-mentioned problem is for the ISO to maintain uniform
energy prices and provide side payments to units whose individually rational decision is
different from ISO’s. In principle, these side payments, also known as “uplift,” should
cover the gap between the maximum possible profit (the optimal objective function value of
problem (4)–(5)), and the profit made by following the ISO’s decision (the value of objective
function (4) evaluated at the ISO’s decisions).
Mathematically, given a set of uniform energy prices pi and an ISO’s welfare-maximizing
decision (p∗,x∗,u∗), the amount of uplift payment needed for unit g equals its lost opportu-
nity cost :
Ug(pi,p
∗,x∗,u∗) = wg(pi)− (pi⊺p∗g − Cg(p∗g,x∗g,u∗g)), (6)
Since the ISO’s decision (p∗,x∗,u∗) is a feasible, but not necessarily optimal solution to
problem (4)–(5), Ug(pi,p
∗,x∗,u∗) is non-negative.
2.3 Convex Hull Pricing and the Lagrangian Dual Problem
Convex hull prices can be determined through a Lagrangian relaxation [13] of the UCED
problem. We dualize the supply-demand balance constraints (2) and obtain the Lagrangian
dual function
q(pi) =
∑
g∈G
(
min
(pg,xg ,ug)∈Xg
Cg(pg,xg,ug)− pi⊺pg
)
+ pi⊺d, (7)
where pi ∈ RT is now the dual vector associated with the supply-demand balance constraints.
The Lagrangian dual problem is
max
pi
q(pi). (8)
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The convex hull prices are defined to be the dual maximizers pi∗. The value function of
the Lagrangian dual problem (8) as a function of d is the convex envelope of v(d) [24]. The
price vector is a sub-gradient of the convex envelope of v(d).
The duality gap between the UCED problem and its dual (7) is exactly the total lost
opportunity costs, ∑
g∈G
Ug(pi,p
∗,x∗,u∗). (9)
Consequently, convex hull pricing as a uniform pricing scheme minimizes total uplift payment
as defined by (9); that is, it minimizes the total lost opportunity costs of all participating
units. This is a special case of a more general result on the type of uplift payments convex
hull pricing minimizes, as shown in [4, 25, 26], since the only type of system-wide constraint
considered for now is the supply-demand balance constraint.
3 A Primal Formulation for Convex Hull Pricing
This section proposes a convex primal formulation for the Lagrangian dual problem of the
UCED problem. In this formulation, the feasible set for each unit is replaced by its convex
hull, and the individual cost functions are replaced by their convex envelopes.
3.1 A Primal Formulation for the Lagrangian Dual Problem
We make the following:
Assumption 1. The set Xg is compact for all g ∈ G, and all system-wide constraints are
linear.
Let conv(·) denote the convex hull of a set.6 Let C∗∗g,Xg(·) be the convex envelope of Cg(·)
taken over Xg. The function C∗∗g,Xg(·) is the largest convex function on conv(Xg) that is an
under-estimator of Cg on Xg. It is also the conjugate of the conjugate of Cg.
Note that the UCED problem is separable across g absent the system-wide constraints.
We have:
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, (a) the optimal objective function value of the Lagrangian
dual problem (8) equals the minimum of the following problem denoted by CHP-Primal:
min
pg,xg,ug,g∈G
∑
g∈G
C∗∗g,Xg(pg,xg,ug) (10)
s.t.
∑
g∈G
pg = d (11)
(pg,xg,ug) ∈ conv(Xg) ∀g ∈ G, (12)
and (b) an optimal dual vector associated with (11) is an optimal solution to (8).
6The convex hull of a set is all convex combinations of points in that set.
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Proof: Since the private and system-wide constraints are defined by linear equali-
ties and inequalities, strong duality holds between CHP-Primal and its Lagrangian dual
problem. Therefore, Theorem 1 holds by Theorem 3.3 in [24].
Theorem 1 suggests that if we have an explicit characterization of C∗∗g,Xg(pg,xg,ug) and
conv(Xg), we can solve CHP-Primal to obtain the dual maximizers of (8). The convex hull
prices are the optimal dual variables associated with the supply-demand balance constraints
(11). Schiro et al. [26] present an equivalent primal formulation. Van Vyve [27] describes
another primal formulation that is restricted to affine cost functions.
3.2 Characterization of the Convex Hulls
The convex hull of a compact set defined by linear inequalities and integrality requirements
is a bounded polyhedron. In general, it is difficult to obtain an explicit description of the
convex hull of a mixed-integer set defined by arbitrary linear constraints. The number of valid
inequalities needed is typically exponential in the size of the input [28]. A general-purpose
method proposed in [29] is used in [26] to obtain a convex hull description of a unit’s feasible
set. This method applies to a feasible set defined by arbitrary linear constraints. All feasible
commitment decisions are enumerated in this method, and both the number of variables
and number of constraints in the resulting description are exponential in the number of time
periods. In addition, Van Vyve [27] presents a more compact convex hull description of a
unit’s feasible set using O(T 3) variables.
Recent polyhedral studies of a unit’s feasible set [19,20,30] exploit its structure. We use
special-purpose valid inequalities proposed in these studies to obtain a tractable description
of conv(Xg), using only O(T ) variables.
Let Lg and lg, respectively, be the minimum up and minimum down times for unit g,
and let p
g
and pg be the minimum and maximum generation levels for unit g. We consider
feasible commitment and dispatch decisions of a unit limited by:
• state-transition constraints that represent the relationship between binary variables:
ugt ≥ xgt − xg,t−1, ∀t ∈ [2, T ], (13)
• minimum up/down time constraints [30]:
t∑
i=t−Lg+1
ugi ≤ xgt, ∀t ∈ [Lg + 1, T ], (14)
t∑
i=t−lg+1
ugi ≤ 1− xg,t−lg , ∀t ∈ [lg + 1, T ], (15)
• dispatch level limits:
xgtpg ≤ pgt ≤ xgtpg, ∀t ∈ [1, T ]. (16)
Ramping constraints are not considered until Section 4.3. Therefore, a unit’s feasible set is
Xg = {pg ∈ RT ,xg ∈ {0, 1}T ,ug ∈ {0, 1}T−1 | (13)–(15), (16)}. (17)
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The set of feasible binary decisions alone is:
Dg = {xg ∈ {0, 1}T ,ug ∈ {0, 1}T−1 | (13)–(15)}. (18)
The following trivial inequalities are valid for Dg:
ugt ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ [2, T ]. (19)
It is claimed in [30] that
conv(Dg) = {xg ∈ RT ,ug ∈ RT−1 |(13)–(15), (19)}. (20)
While this statement is true, the proof of it relies on a lemma that states that all the extreme
points of the polytope defined in (20) are integral, Lemma 2.9 in [30]. The proof of Lemma 2.9
given in [30] is flawed, however.7 We identify the flaws and give our own proof in Appendix.
We also note that the minimum up/down time constraints in [30] have been used in
recent literature on tight formulations of the UCED problem, such as [22, 31, 32].
The following theorem extends the result in (20) to also include the dispatch decisions:
Theorem 2. The result shown in (20) implies that
Cg = {pg ∈ RT ,xg ∈ RT ,ug ∈ RT−1 | (13)–(16), (19)}
describes the convex hull of Xg.8
Proof: Since all the inequalities that describe Cg are valid, it suffices to prove that all
extreme points of Cg have binary values for commitment and start-up variables.
Suppose that (pˆg, xˆg, uˆg) is an extreme point of Cg. By definition, among constraints
(13)–(16), (19), 3T − 1 linearly independent constraints are active at (pˆg, xˆg, uˆg). Only
constraints (16) involve vector pg. Therefore, out of the 3T −1 active constraints, T of them
must be of type (16).
For the T active constraints of type (16), either pˆgt = xˆgtpg or pˆgt = xˆgtpg. Let {T , T } be
a partition of the set {1, . . . , T}, so that pˆgt = xˆgtpg, ∀t ∈ T , and that pˆgt = xˆgtpg, ∀t ∈ T .
It is easy to show that these active constraints are linearly independent.
More importantly, the projection of
{pg ∈ RT ,xg ∈ RT ,ug ∈ RT−1 | pgt = xgtpg, ∀t ∈ T , pgt = xgtpg, ∀t ∈ T } (21)
onto the (xg,ug)-space is the whole of R
T ×RT−1. To see this, consider any point (x′g,u′g) ∈
R
T ×RT−1. Let p′gt = x′gtpg, ∀t ∈ T , and let p′gt = x′gtpg, ∀t ∈ T . By construction, the point
(p′g,x
′
g,u
′
g) is in set (21).
In addition to the T active constraints of type (16), 2T − 1 other linearly independent
constraints must be active at (pˆg, xˆg, uˆg). These 2T −1 constraints can only be of type (13)–
(15) or (19). Because the projection of the set (21) onto the (xg,ug)-space is R
T × RT−1,
and because the number of such active constraints equals the number of variables, the values
of (xˆg, uˆg) are completely determined by these 2T − 1 active constraints. Lemma 2.9 in [30]
implies that any such 2T − 1 constraints lead to binary (xˆg, uˆg).
7We thank Dr. Dane A. Schiro and Dr. Eugene Litvinov for pointing this out to us.
8For T = 2 and T = 3, the convex hull of a more general Xg with ramping constraints has been charac-
terized in [20]. The result here does not consider ramping constraints, but holds for an arbitrary T .
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3.3 Characterization of the Convex Envelopes
In CHP-Primal, each cost function Cg(·) is replaced by its convex envelope taken over the
non-convex feasible set Xg. When a unit has a constant marginal cost, Cg(·) is affine, and
the convex envelope of Cg(·) has the same functional form as Cg(·) itself.
When Cg(·) is not affine (piecewise linear or quadratic in pg), its convex envelope has a
different functional form. We first discuss the convex quadratic case.
Let the start-up and no-load cost of unit g be hg and cg, respectively. Define the following
set:
Xgt = {pgt ∈ R, xgt ∈ {0, 1}, ugt ∈ {0, 1} | xgtpg ≤ pgt ≤ xgtpg}.
Suppose the offer cost function Cg : Xg → R is defined by:
Cg(pg,xg,ug) =
T∑
t=1
Cgt(pgt, xgt, ugt), (22)
where for each period t, Cgt : Xgt → R is a convex quadratic function defined by a single-
period cost function:
Cgt(pgt, xgt, ugt) = agp
2
gt + bgpgt + cgxgt + hgugt, (23)
where we assume ag > 0. The convex envelope of Cg is characterized by the following
theorem.9
Theorem 3. The convex envelope of the quadratic cost function Cg taken over Xg is the
function C∗∗g,Xg : conv(Xg)→ R defined by the following:
C∗∗g,Xg(pg,xg,ug) =
T∑
t=1
C∗∗gt,Xgt(pgt, xgt, ugt),
where C∗∗gt,Xgt : conv(Xgt)→ R is defined by the following:
C∗∗gt,Xgt(pgt, xgt, ugt) =
{
ag
p2gt
xgt
+ bgpgt + cgxgt + hgugt, xgt > 0,
0, xgt = 0.
Proof: We first show that C∗∗gt,Xgt is the convex envelope of the single-period cost
function Cgt. Consider the value of the function C
∗∗
gt,Xgt
with ugt fixed at zero:
C∗∗gt,Xgt(pgt, xgt, 0) =
{
ag
p2gt
xgt
+ bgpgt + cgxgt, xgt > 0,
0, xgt = 0,
(24)
9Aktu¨rk et al. [33] describe a similar result that considers a more general polynomial function. However,
our result considers a multi-period domain, and is more general in another direction. We thank Dr. Alper
Atamtu¨rk for pointing this out to us.
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Figure 1: Convex envelope of a single-period cost function. The figure shows the graph of a
single-period cost function 0.2p2gt + pgt + 4xgt defined on {xgt ∈ {0, 1}, pgt ∈ R |xgt ≤ pgt ≤ 5xgt}
(black dot and black curved line), together with its convex envelope (the colored surface).
as (pgt, xgt) varies over {pgt ∈ R, xgt ∈ [0, 1] | xgtpg ≤ pgt ≤ xgtpg}. At points with xgt ∈ {0, 1},
the graph of this function is the same as Cgt(pgt, xgt, 0). The graph of this function at any
point (pgt, xgt) with xgt ∈ (0, 1) is determined by the line segment connecting (0, 0, 0) and
( pgt
xgt
, 1, Cgt(
pgt
xgt
, 1, 0)). This function is continuous and convex on {pgt ∈ R, xgt ∈ [0, 1] | xgtpg ≤
pgt ≤ xgtpg}, as can be verified by taking its Hessian in this domain.
We prove by contradiction that among the convex under-estimators of Cgt(pgt, xgt, 0) on
the given domain, C∗∗gt,Xgt(pgt, xgt, 0) is the largest one. Suppose not, then there exists a
convex under-estimator of Cgt(pgt, xgt, 0), denoted by C
′
gt(pgt, xgt, 0), for which there exist
a point (p′gt, x
′
gt) with x
′
gt ∈ (0, 1) such that C ′gt(p′gt, x′gt, 0) > C∗∗gt (p′gt, x′gt, 0). Consider
the line interval connecting (0, 0, 0) and (
p′gt
x′gt
, 1, Cgt(
p′gt
x′gt
, 1, 0)). We have C ′gt(p
′
gt, x
′
gt, 0) >
C∗∗gt (p
′
gt, x
′
gt, 0) = 0 + x
′
gtCgt(
p′gt
x′gt
, 1, 0), which implies that C ′gt is not convex when restricted
to this line. This contradicts the convexity of C ′gt, since a function is convex if and only if it
is convex when restricted to any line that intersects its domain [34, Chapter 3]. Therefore,
C∗∗gt,Xgt(pgt, xgt, 0) is the convex envelope of Cgt(pgt, xgt, 0).
Fig. 1 shows an example of Cgt(pgt, xgt, 0) and its convex envelope. Since Cgt is affine in
ugt, C
∗∗
gt,Xgt
(pgt, xgt, ugt) is the convex envelope of Cgt(pgt, xgt, ugt).
Now consider the time-coupled domain Xg. Let X ′g =
∏T
t=1Xgt, so that Xg ⊆ X ′g. The
set X ′g\Xg contains the commitment and dispatch decisions that satisfy generation limit
constraints (16) but not constraints (13)–(15). Because constraints (13)–(15) restrict the
binary variables xg and ug, (X ′g\Xg) ∩ conv(Xg) = ∅. Consequently, X ′g ∩ conv(Xg) = Xg.
By the separability of Cg and X ′g across t, we have that the convex envelope of Cg taken
over X ′g is the function C∗∗g,X ′g : conv(X ′g)→ R defined by:
C∗∗g,X ′g(pg,xg,ug) =
T∑
t=1
{
ag
p2gt
xgt
+ bgpgt + cgxgt + hgugt, xgt > 0,
0, xgt = 0.
Note that taking the convex envelope of a function is equivalent to taking the convex hull
of its epigraph. Because X ′g ∩ conv(Xg) = Xg, on conv(Xg), the convex hull of the epigraph
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of Cg taken over Xg is the same as the convex hull of the epigraph taken over X ′g. Therefore,
on conv(Xg), C∗∗g,X ′g(pg,xg,ug) = C∗∗g,Xg(pg,xg,ug).
Using the convex envelopes gives us a better lower bound than simply keeping the func-
tional form of Cgt,Xgt and relaxing its domain. Given g ∈ G, t ∈ [1, T ], and pgt > 0, when xgt
is binary, C∗∗gt,Xgt(pgt, xgt, 0) = Cgt,Xgt(pgt, xgt, 0); when xgt is fractional, we have
p2gt
xgt
> p2gt.
We next consider convex piecewise linear cost functions. Suppose the interval [p
g
, pg] is
partitioned into |K| intervals:
[p
g
, pg] =
⋃
k∈K
Ik, (25)
where k is the index for the partitioned intervals.
Recalling that hg denotes the start-up cost of unit g, suppose at each period t, when
pgt ∈ Ik, the operating cost (excluding start-up cost and no-load cost) is
C˜gt(pgt, 1, 0) = agkpgt + bgk. (26)
Introducing an auxiliary variable sgt ∈ R+, the single-period piecewise linear cost function
can be implemented as
C˜gt(pgt, xgt, ugt) = sgt + cgxgt + hgugt, (27)
sgt ≥ agkpgt + bgk, ∀k ∈ K. (28)
The convex envelope of a convex piecewise linear cost function taken over Xg is also
piecewise linear. The proof is similar to that for Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. The convex envelope of the convex piecewise linear cost function C˜gt taken over
Xg is the function C˜∗∗g,Xg : conv(Xg)→ R defined by:
C˜∗∗g,Xg(pg,xg,ug) =
T∑
t=1
{
agkpgt + (cg + bgk)xgt + hgugt, if
pgt
xgt
∈ Ik,
0, if xgt = 0.
Typically, bgk is non-positive. Therefore, similar to the quadratic case, using the convex
envelopes gives us a better lower bound than the implementation shown in (27) and (28).
3.4 Reformulation and Polynomial-Time Solution
Theorems 1–4 imply that, if each unit faces only generation limits and minimum up/down
constraints, exact convex hull prices can be determined by solving CHP-Primal with the
convex hulls and convex envelopes explicitly described. All variables are continuous inCHP-
Primal.
When the cost functions are quadratic, non-linearity of the convex envelope comes from
the quadratic-over-linear terms ag
p2gt
xgt
which are known to be convex. Moreover, we can move
these terms from the objective into constraints and cast CHP-Primal as a second-order
cone program (SOCP).
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For each g and t, we replace ag
p2gt
xgt
by a new variable sgt ∈ R+ and introduce the following
constraint:
sgtxgt ≥ agp2gt. (29)
Since we are minimizing, when xgt = 0, the optimal value for sgt is zero, which is consistent
with the convex envelope. For xgt ≥ 0 and sgt ≥ 0, constraint (29) is equivalent to
‖(2√agpgt, xgt − sgt)‖2 ≤ xgt + sgt, (30)
which is a second-order cone constraint [35]. With this reformulation technique, CHP-
Primal can be cast as an SOCP, which can be solved in polynomial time using off-the-shelf
interior-point solvers, e.g. GUROBI [36].
In the case where the cost functions are piecewise linear, the convex envelope of the cost
function is convex piecewise linear. The resulting CHP-Primal is a linear program (LP).
Since the number of constraints in our explicit formulation is polynomial in T and |G|,
the convex hull pricing problem can be solved as a convex program in polynomial time in
both cases. Note that in an optimal solution to CHP-Primal, the commitment and start-
up variables can be fractional. In convex hull pricing, we focus on the optimality of dual
variables. The ISO’s commitment and dispatch decisions are still determined by the UCED
problem.
4 Extensions
4.1 Transmission and Other Linear System-Wide Constraints
To determine locational convex hull prices, we consider a linear approximation to the trans-
mission constraints and augment CHP-Primal with angle-eliminated transmission con-
straints in terms of the shift factors. The locational prices can be derived as a function of the
dual variables associated with the supply-demand balance constraints and the transmission
constraints, as in locational marginal pricing [37, Chapter 8.11]. Other linear system-wide
constraints (e.g., contingency constraints, constraints that approximate loss in the transmis-
sion system) can be treated in a similar fashion. Theorem 1 does not apply to nonlinear
system-wide constraints [38].
Note that in the presence of system-wide constraints that do not necessarily hold as
equalities at a welfare-maximizing solution, such as the transmission constraints, the gap
between the UCED problem and its dual includes not only the total lost opportunity cost
of the units, but also another type of uplift that addresses the ISO’s revenue insufficiency
[25, 26].
4.2 Ancillary Services
In markets where energy and ancillary services are co-optimized, a set of variables are intro-
duced to represent the ancillary services provided by market participants. We use spinning
reserve as an example.
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Let vector rg denote the amount of spinning reserve provided by generator g in each time
period. Let rg and rg be the lower and upper limits on spinning reserve. We include the
following constraints:
xgtpg ≤ pgt + rgt ≤ xgtpg, ∀t ∈ [1, T ], (31)
xgtrg ≤ rgt ≤ xgtrg, ∀t ∈ [1, T ]. (32)
The feasible set for each unit is redefined to be
Xg = {pg ∈ RT , rg ∈ RT ,xg ∈ {0, 1}T ,ug ∈ {0, 1}T−1 | (13)–(15), (31), (32)}.
We can show that
conv(Xg) = {pg ∈ RT , rg ∈ RT ,xg ∈ RT ,ug ∈ RT−1 | (13)–(15), (19), (31), (32)}.
The proof is similar to that for Theorem 2.
Since the convex envelope of a convex function taken over a convex domain is the convex
function itself, and since the additional constraints (31) and (32) define a convex feasible set,
introducing ancillary services does not alter the convex envelope. Since we explicitly char-
acterize both the convex hulls and convex envelopes, we can obtain exact convex hull prices
using CHP-Primal augmented with (31), (32), and system-wide constraints for ancillary
services.
4.3 Ramping Constraints
Let vg denote unit g’s start-up/shut-down ramp rate limit, and let vg be unit g’s ramp-
up/down rate when committed. Ramping constraints are a set of private constraints that
limit the increase or decrease of power output from one time period to the next [20]:
pgt − pg,t−1 ≤ vgxg,t−1 + vg(1− xg,t−1), ∀t ∈ [2, T ], (33)
pg,t−1 − pgt ≤ vgxgt + vg(1− xgt), ∀t ∈ [2, T ]. (34)
We redefine the feasible set for each unit to be
Xg = {pg ∈ RT ,xg ∈ {0, 1}T ,ug ∈ {0, 1}T−1 | (13)–(15), (16), (33), (34)}. (35)
Ramping constraints define a convex feasible set, and thus do not change the convex
envelope of the cost function. They complicate the convex hulls, however. When these
time-coupled constraints are included in the definition of Xg, equations (13)–(15), (19), (16),
together with ramping constraints (33) and (34) themselves, do not completely characterize
conv(Xg). Additional valid inequalities are needed to describe the convex hulls. The number
of valid inequalities needed is in general exponential in T [19].
Explicit descriptions of conv(Xg) for the case where T = 2 and T = 3 are shown in [20].
More importantly, valid inequalities in these descriptions can be applied to any two or three
consecutive time periods to tighten the approximation of conv(Xg) for T > 3.
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When considering ramping constraints, we solve an approximation of CHP-Primal that
includes the above-mentioned valid constraints for T = 2 and T = 3. Our description of
conv(Xg) is not exact. Consequently, our approximation provides a lower bound for CHP-
Primal. The gap between the approximated CHP-Primal and the UCED problem gives
an upper bound for the duality gap between the UCED problem and its Lagrangian dual
problem.
A UCED problem only represents averaged ramping over the length of a time period.
When the time resolution is one hour, sub-hourly ramping in opposite directions may cancel
out. Therefore, we believe that our approximation is close, especially for a day-ahead market
in which ramping constraints are less likely to be binding compared to a real-time market.
Note also that a time-decoupled pricing problem is used in MISO’s single-hour approximation
of convex hull pricing [5]. This pricing problem includes ramping constraints, but does not
capture the time-coupling implications of ramping.
4.4 Minimization of Uplift Payments to a Subset of the Partici-
pating Units
In certain electricity markets, only a subset of the participating units G can receive uplift
payments. For example, it may be the case that only units dispatched to a strictly positive
generation level are qualified for uplift payments; that is, units are not paid for merely
participating in the market. In this case, the duality gap that convex hull pricing minimizes
includes terms that might not end up being paid.
Let the set of units that are qualified to receive uplift payments be G ′ ⊆ G. If the
qualifications can be determined prior to computing the prices, we can solve CHP-Primal
with G replaced by G ′. The duality gap that the resulting prices minimize includes only
uplift payments to units in G ′.
4.5 Committing to Prices
In convex hull pricing, prices that are coupled across multiple time periods as a whole
minimize uplift payments over the specified horizon T of the underlying UCED problem. A
subset of these prices does not necessarily minimize uplift payments over any shorter time
horizon that is a subset of T . In a day-ahead market, the whole set of 24 hourly prices is
calculated and posted at once, so that the coupling would not be problematic insofar as the
ISO commits to buying and selling at these prices.
In contrast, look-ahead real-time markets are operated on a rolling basis where only
the commitment, dispatch, and price calculated for the upcoming interval are implemented.
Therefore, the coupling inherent across a single look-ahead dispatch may not be represented
appropriately by the sequence of convex hull prices, each of which corresponds to the up-
coming interval in each successive look-ahead dispatch.
To make prices consistent across successive look-ahead dispatches, [39] suggests that the
pricing model represent past intervals in the convex hull pricing model, keep the commitment
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and dispatch decisions in the past as variables, but constrain prices in the past intervals to be
equal to the realized prices. A simple way to achieve this in CHP-Primal is to add in each
past interval a fictitious power source/sink to the system with infinite generation capacity,
infinite consumption capacity, and a constant marginal cost/willingness to pay equal to the
realized price. This power source/sink constrains past prices to be equal to the realized
prices, and maintains the coupling between realized and upcoming prices to minimize uplift
payments given the realized prices. In the transmission-constrained case, we can add in
each past interval a fictitious power source/sink to the slack bus with a constant marginal
cost equal to the realized price at the slack bus, and dualize transmission constraints that
correspond to congested lines with a penalty equal to their realized optimal dual variable.
5 Numerical Results
We implement CHP-Primal on a personal computer with a 2.2-GHz quad-core CPU and 16
GB of RAM. The optimization problems are modeled in CVX [40] and solved with GUROBI
6.5 [36]. We consider four examples from the literature. The time resolution in all examples
is one hour.
5.1 Example 1
We consider an example from [26] in which two units (including a block-loaded one) serve 35
MW of load in a single period. We modify the original example by including a start-up cost
for each unit. Table 1 specifies each unit’s offers. Both units are assumed to be off initially.
The optimal (and the only feasible) solution to the ISO’s UCED problem is for unit 1 to
generate 35 MW and for unit 2 to stay offline.
Unit 1 is marginal10 and sets the LMP. Seeing the LMP, unit 2’s profit-maximizing
decision is to go online and generate 50 MW, which would result in a profit of $1900.
Therefore, based on the definition of Ug in (6), unit 2 has a lost opportunity cost of $1900.
The start-up cost of unit 1 is not covered by LMP. An uplift payment of $100 is needed to
make unit 1 whole (guarantee a non-negative profit).
CHP-Primal for this example is an LP and gives the exact convex hull price (CHP).
The resulting uplift payments are lower than those under LMP but still quite large (Table
2).
Suppose that only units dispatched to a strictly positive generation level are qualified
for uplift payments. In this situation, unit 2 does not receive any compensation for its lost
opportunity cost. As suggested in Section 4.4, to minimize the uplift payment to the qualified
units, we can instead solve CHP-Primal with unit 2 excluded. We refer to this pricing
scheme as CHPq (CHP for qualified units). Table 2 shows that, if only unit 1 is qualified for
compensation, CHPq results in a lower uplift payment ($30) than CHP ($1430).
10A marginal unit has an optimal dispatch level strictly between its maximum and minimum power output.
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Table 1: Supply Offers in Example 1
Unit
Start-up No-load Energy p
g
pg
$ $ $/MWh MW MW
1 100 0 50 10 50
2 100 0 10 50 50
Table 2: Comparison of Different Pricing Schemes for Example 1
Pricing Scheme
pi U1 U2
$/MWh $ $
LMP 50 100 1900
CHP 12 1430 0
CHPq 52 30 -
Table 3: Units in Example 2
Unit
No-load Energy p
g
pg Ramp Rate
$ $/MWh MW MW MW/hr
1 0 60 0 100 120
2 600 56 0 100 60
5.2 Example 2
We investigate a three-period two-unit example from [41] with ramping constraints but
without startup costs. Table 3 shows the supply offers and ramp rate limits. All units are
assumed to be off initially. Table 4 presents the optimal commitment and dispatch decisions
as well as the demand in each period. Ramping constraints require unit 2 to commit at
t = 2 so that it can ramp up to the generation level needed at t = 3. Table 5 displays energy
prices and uplift payments under different pricing schemes.
Since unit 1 is the marginal unit in all three periods, the LMPs are set by unit 1 at
$60/MWh. The payment based on LMPs covers all of unit 1 costs. An uplift payment of
$560 is needed to “make unit 2 whole”.
We can approximate conv(Xg) with constraints (13)–(16), (19), and ramping constraints.
We refer to this pricing method as aCHP1 (approximate CHP). In aCHP2, we augment
our formulation with valid inequalities describing conv(Xg) with T = 2. Finally, using the
description of conv(Xg) for T = 3, we formulate the convex hulls in this three-period example,
which results in the exact convex hull prices.
Table 5 shows the energy prices and uplift payments under different pricing schemes. For
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Table 4: Optimal Commitment and Dispatch for Example 2
t
dt x1,t p1,t x2,t p2,t
MW MW MW
1 70 1 70 0 0
2 100 1 40 1 60
3 170 1 70 1 100
Table 5: Comparison of Different Pricing Schemes for Example 2
Pricing Scheme
pi1 pi2 pi3 U1 U2
$/MWh $/MWh $/MWh $ $
LMP 60 60 60 0 560
aCHP1 60 60 64 120 160
aCHP2 60 60 65.6 168 0
CHP 60 60 65.6 168 0
this example, as the approximation of conv(Xg) becomes more accurate, the energy price at
t = 3 increases. Roughly speaking, unit 1 has an increasing incentive to generate more than
the ISO’s optimal dispatch, increasing its lost opportunity cost, but unit 2’s no-load costs
can be better covered, decreasing its lost opportunity cost. The net effect is a decrease in
total uplift as pi3 increases.
Note that the prices resulting from aCHP2 happen to equal the exact convex hull prices.
This result implies that the valid inequalities for T = 3 are “non-binding”. The approxima-
tion of conv(Xg) in aCHP2 is accurate enough to yield the exact convex hull prices for this
example.
5.3 Example 3
We consider a 24-period 32-unit example from [15]. The cost functions for the units are linear.
There are no ramping or transmission constraints. CHP-Primal is an LP through which
the exact convex hull prices can be obtained. CHP-Primal solves in 0.02 seconds, resulting
in the same convex hull prices as reported in [15]. The duality gap between the UCED
problem and its Lagrangian dual problem is $1 148, which equals the total lost opportunity
cost.
We also implement a standard sub-gradient method to solve the Lagrangian dual problem
in the dual space. We adopt the step length update rule (c) shown in [17, Theorem 10.4]. We
implement the dual updates in MATLAB, and solve the inner-level integer programs with
GUROBI. Since the standard sub-gradient method does not have a non-heuristic stopping
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criterion, we terminate the algorithm after 550 iterations when the objective function shows
no improvement. The resulting objective function value is 0.88% sub-optimal with respect
to the exact dual maximum we obtained from CHP-Primal, and the total computational
time is 37.3s.
5.4 Example 4
We consider a 96-period 76-unit 8-bus example that is based on structural attributes and
data from ISO New England [42]. We consider the start-up costs, no-load costs, minimum
up/down time constraints, and ramping constraints for the generation units. The cost func-
tions are quadratic. We use Scenario 1 of the 90 load scenarios provided in [42]. Minimum
generation levels for the units are not specified in the original data, so we let p = 0.8p for
each nuclear plant and p = 0.6p for each coal-fired unit. The units’ initial statuses are not
provided. We solve a single-period UCED problem to obtain the optimal commitment and
dispatch decisions for period 1. We use these optimal decisions as the units’ initial statuses,
and assume that the units have been on/off for sufficiently long time so that the minimum
up/down time constraints are not initially binding. The flow limits of the 12 transmission
lines in the system are not defined in the original data. Therefore, we first investigate the
case without transmission constraints (Case 1). We then set a limit of 2100 MW on the flow
over each transmission line (Case 2).
For each case, we first solve the UCED problem and obtain the LMPs. We then determine
convex hull prices using two methods: an approximation of CHP-Primal and the single-
period approximation proposed in [5]. Because of the ramping constraints, we approximate
conv(Xg) using constraints (13)–(16), (19), along with valid inequalities that completely
characterize these convex hulls for T = 2 and T = 3. We use the convex envelope described
in Theorem 3 and solve the primal formulation as an SOCP. When solving the UCED
problems, we include above-mentioned valid inequalities a priori, and set MIPgap to 0.01%.
Table 6 shows the results for the UCED problem and the approximated CHP-Primal,
as well as the relative gap between these two problems. The approximated CHP-Primal
solves in polynomial time with respect to the number of constraints. However, if we were
to solve the Lagrangian dual problem in the dual space for Case 2, there would be 2400
dual variables. Such a large number of dual variables due to transmission constraints creates
difficulties for non-smooth optimization methods [43].
The relative gap between approximated CHP-Primal and the UCED problem (called
CHP gap hereafter) is 0.06% for Case 1 and 0.10% for Case 2. This small CHP gap bounds
two other gaps from above. First, the duality gap between the UCED problem and its
Lagrangian dual problem can only be smaller than the CHP gap. This verifies the theoretical
result shown in [44], which states that the relative duality gap of the UCED problem and
its Lagrangian dual approaches zero as the number of heterogeneous generators approaches
infinity. Second, the approximation error (the gap between the conceptual CHP-Primal
and our approximation) is bounded from above by the CHP gap.
Table 7 compares the total uplift payment under the three pricing schemes. We only
consider units’ lost opportunity costs. In the single-period approximation, start-up and
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Table 6: UCED and approximated CHP-Primal for Example 4
Case 1 Case 2
UCED Obj.($) 41 972 688 42 303 772
UCED CPU Time (s) 87.42 112.02
CHP-Primal Obj. ($) 41 946 298 42 259 962
CHP-Primal CPU Time (s) 6.22 13.04
Gap (%) 0.063 0.104
Table 7: Total Lost Opportunity Cost ($) for Example 4
LMP
Primal
Formulation
for CHP
Single-Period
Approxima-
tion of
CHP
Case 1 183 473 33 965 96 938
Case 2 329 032 40 863 177 391
no-load costs are considered only for fast-start units. We classify a unit with a minimum
up/down time of one hour as a fast-start unit, and 18 units fall into this category. We
allocate start-up costs to peak usage hours. In both cases, each single-period approximation
solves in much less than a second. The convex hull prices derived from the proposed method
result in the least uplift payment in both cases.
6 Conclusions
This paper has proposed a polynomially-solvable primal formulation for the Lagrangian
dual problem of the unit commitment and economic dispatch (UCED) problem. This primal
formulation explicitly describes the convex hull of each unit’s feasible set and the convex
envelope of each unit’s cost function. We show that exact convex hull prices can be obtained
in the absence of ramping constraints, and that exactness is preserved when we consider
ancillary services or any linear system-wide constraints. A tractable approximation applies
when ramping constraints are considered.
We cast our formulation as a second-order cone program if the cost functions are quadratic,
and as a linear program if the cost functions are affine or piecewise linear. Convex hull prices
are thereby determined in a robust and scalable manner. A 96-period 76-unit transmission-
constrained example solves in less than fifteen seconds on a personal computer. This example
shows that prices obtained through our formulation further reduce uplift payments compared
to a single-period approximation of convex hull pricing.
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The results of our paper have important applications beyond pricing. The convex en-
velopes in our paper can be used to tighten the formulation of the UCED problem (e.g., the
ones proposed in [22] and [31]). Our primal formulation is also a tight convex relaxation of
the UCED problem. Because of computational complexity, many planning models for the
generation and/or transmission system currently use only an embedded economic dispatch
model for system operation, rather than a more realistic UCED model. The proposed primal
formulation should provide a better and tractable approximation for system operation.
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Appendix: A Proof of Lemma 2.9 in [30]
Over a time horizon T ∈ Z++, consider a generating unit with minimum up time of L ∈ Z+
dispatch intervals and minimum down time of l ∈ Z+ dispatch intervals. Let x (denoted by
u in [30]) be the commitment vector and u (denoted by v in [30]) be the start-up vector.
The commitment polytope of a unit DT (L, l) is defined to be
DT (L, l) = {x ∈ RT ,u ∈ RT−1 |
t∑
i=t−L+1
ui ≤ xt, ∀t ∈ [L+ 1, T ], (36)
t∑
i=t−l+1
ui ≤ 1− xt−l, ∀t ∈ [l + 1, T ], (37)
ut ≥ xt − xt−1, ∀t ∈ [2, T ], (38)
ut ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ [2, T ]}. (39)
To simplify our proof, let w be the shut-down vector, so that
wt = ut + xt−1 − xt, ∀t ∈ [2, T ]. (40)
Lemma 2.9 in [30]:
Lemma 1. Let (x,u) ∈ DT (L, l). Then there exist integral points as ∈ DT (L, l), s ∈ S, and
λs ∈ R+, s ∈ S such that
(i). x =
∑
s∈S λsx(a
s), u =
∑
s∈S λsu(a
s), and
∑
s∈S λs = 1;
(ii). let Sdt be the set of all points that have been shut down at t, then ∀t ∈ [2, T ], wt =∑
s∈Sdt
λs;
(iii). let Sut be the set of all points that have been started up at t, then ∀t ∈ [2, T ], ut =∑
s∈Sut
λs,
where u(as) is the u vector corresponding to as.
This lemma states that any point in DT (L, l) can be written as a convex combination of
a set of integral points in this polytope. This implies that every extreme point of DT (L, l)
is integral.
The proof of this lemma provided in [30] has the following flaws:
• the proof by induction uses a base case of D2(1, 1) and an inductive step that shows
the statements are true for DT (L, l) if they are true for DT−1(L, l). Multiple natural
numbers are varying, and induction must be applied to T , L and l;
• in the inductive step, the authors consider “ut of the integral points”, which is not
well-defined, since a fraction of a natural number can be fractional;
• the determination of λs is not specified.
We state the lemma in a slightly different way and give a proof of the new lemma.
Lemma 2. For all T ∈ Z++\{1}, ∀L, l ∈ Z+ such that L ≤ T − 1 and l ≤ T − 1, ∀(x,u) ∈
DT (L, l), there exists a set of integral points {(xˆs, uˆs), s ∈ S = {1, 2, . . . , |S|}} ⊂ DT (L, l),
and {λs ∈ R+, s ∈ S} such that
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(i). x =
∑
s∈S λ
sxˆs, u =
∑
s∈S λ
suˆs, and
∑
s∈S λ
s = 1;
(ii). for all t ∈ [2, T ], wt =
∑
s∈St,d
λs, where St,d = {s | wˆst = 1};
(iii). for all t ∈ [2, T ], ut =
∑
s∈St,u
λs, where St,u = {s | uˆst = 1}.
Proof. We prove by induction.
Base case: consider T = 2. Since the time resolution we consider is one dispatch interval,
a minimum up/down time of less than one dispatch interval has the same effect as a minimum
up/down time of one dispatch interval. Therefore, D2(1, 1) = D2(1, 0) = D2(0, 1) = D2(0, 0),
so that we can only consider the case D2(1, 1), which is the case considered in the original
proof of [30].
Induction hypothesis: suppose the given statement holds for T − 1, where T > 2 and
T ∈ Z. That is, suppose ∀L′, l′ ∈ Z+ such that L′ ≤ T − 2 and l′ ≤ T − 2, ∀(x,u) ∈
DT−1(L
′, l′), there exists a set of integral points {(x˜s, u˜s), s ∈ S ′ = {1, 2, . . . , |S ′|}} ⊂
DT−1(L
′, l′), and {µs ∈ R+, s ∈ S ′} such that (i), (ii), and (iii) hold.
We need to show: the statement holds for T . That is, ∀L, l ∈ Z+ such that L ≤ T − 1
and l ≤ T − 1, ∀(x,u) ∈ DT (L, l), there exists a set of integral points {(xˆs, uˆs), s ∈ S =
{1, 2, . . . , |S|}} ⊂ DT (L, l), and {λs ∈ R+, s ∈ S} such that (i), (ii), and (iii) hold.
Given any L, l ∈ Z++ such that L ≤ T−1 and l ≤ T−1, and given any (x,u) ∈ DT (L, l),
we drop the last entry of x and denote the truncated vector by x ∈ RT−1. Similarly, we
drop the last entry of u and denote the truncated vector as u ∈ RT−2. We then have
(x,u) ∈ DT−1(L − 1, l − 1).11 Since L − 1 ≤ T − 2 and l − 1 ≤ T − 2, by the induction
hypothesis, we can find a set of integral points {(x˜s, u˜s), s ∈ S ′} and {µs ∈ R+, s ∈ S ′} that
satisfy (i), (ii), and (iii). Similarly, we let S ′t,d = {s | w˜st = 1} and S ′t,u = {s | u˜st = 1}.
We construct {(xˆs, uˆs), s ∈ S} ⊂ DT (L, l) from {(x˜s, u˜s), s ∈ S ′} ⊂ DT−1(L−1, l−1) by
defining all but the last components of xˆs and uˆs to be the same as x˜s and u˜s, respectively,
and appending a T -th component as needed. When necessary, we may construct more than
one (xˆs, uˆs) based on a single (x˜s, u˜s). We construct (xˆs, uˆs) in a way that allows us to find
a set of λs satisfying (i), (ii), and (iii).
To facilitate our proof, we partition S ′ into S ′1 and S ′2, so that
S ′1 = {s ∈ S ′ | x˜sT−1 = 1}, (41)
and
S ′2 = {s ∈ S ′ | x˜sT−1 = 0}. (42)
That is, S ′1 contains integral points that involve the unit being on at time T − 1.
We further partition S ′1 into S ′11 and S ′12, so that
S ′11 = {s ∈ S ′1 | u˜sT−L+1 = u˜sT−L+2 = · · · = u˜sT−1 = 0}. (43)
and S ′12 = S ′1\S ′11. That is, the integral points in S ′11 involve the unit not starting up during
t ∈ [T − L+ 1, T − 1].
11For the boundary cases where either L or l equals one, or both, note thatDT (L, 0) = DT (L, 1),DT (0, l) =
DT (1, l), and DT (0, 0) = DT (1, 1).
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Similarly, we partition S ′2 into S ′21 and S ′22, so that
S ′21 = {s ∈ S ′1 | w˜sT−l+1 = w˜sT−l+2 = · · · = w˜sT−1 = 0}, (44)
and S ′22 = S ′2\S ′21. That is, the integral points in S ′21 involve the unit not shutting down
during t ∈ [T − l + 1, T − 1].
We have effectively partitioned S ′ into S ′11, S ′12, S ′21, and S ′22, which results in the following
properties:
• ∑s∈S′
1
µs = xT−1, and
∑
s∈S′
2
µs = 1− xT−1.
• ∑s∈S′
11
µs ≥ wT .
To see this, notice that
∑
s∈S′
11
µs = xT−1−
∑T−1
t=T−L+1
∑
s∈S′t,u
µs = xT−1−
∑T−1
t=T−L+1 ut,
where the first equality follows the definition of S ′11 and S ′t,u, and the second equality fol-
lows from (iii). Now we invoke the turn on inequality at T forDT (L, l):
∑T
t=T−L+1 ut =∑T−1
t=T−L+1 ut+uT ≤ xT . Applying this turn on inequality to the previous equality yields∑
s∈S′
11
µs ≥ −xT + xT−1 + uT . The desired result follows from (40).
• ∑s∈S′
21
µs ≥ uT .
To see this, notice that
∑
s∈S′
21
µs = 1 − xT−1 −
∑T−1
t=T−l+1
∑
s∈S′
t,d
µs = 1 − xT−1 −∑T−1
t=T−l+1wt, where the first equality is by definition of S ′21 and S ′t,d, and the second
equality follows from (ii). Now we invoke the turn off inequality at T for DT (L, l):∑T
t=T−l+1wt =
∑T−1
t=T−l+1wt + wT ≤ 1 − xT . Applying this turn off inequality to the
previous equality yields
∑
s∈S′
21
µs ≥ xT − xT−1 + wT . The desired result follows from
(40).
To satisfy (ii), we would like to append a one to some of the shut-down vectors w˜s
and assign positive values to their associated λs, so that wT =
∑
s∈ST,d
λs. Because of the
minimum up time constraints, we can only append a one to those w˜s with s ∈ S ′11.
To satisfy (iii), we would like to append a one to some of the start-up vectors u˜s and assign
positive values to their associated λs, so that uT =
∑
s∈ST,u
λs. Because of the minimum
down time constraints, we can only append a one to those u˜s with s ∈ S ′21.
We construct {(xˆs, uˆs), s ∈ S} according to the following rules:
• Construct two integral points (xˆs1, uˆs1), (xˆs2, uˆs2) from each {(x˜s, u˜s), s ∈ S ′11}. Each
shut-down vector wˆs1 is created by appending a one to w˜s, and each wˆs2 is created by
appending a zero. Each start-up vector uˆs1 and uˆs2 can only be created by appending
a zero to u˜s. Each commitment vector xˆs1 is created by appending a zero to x˜s, and
each xˆs2 is created by appending a one. We set λs1 + λs2 = µs, ∀s ∈ S ′11. Because∑
s∈S′
11
µs ≥ wT , we can find λs1, λs2, s ∈ S ′11 such that
∑
s∈S′
11
λs1 = wT .
• Construct only one integral point (xˆs, uˆs) from each {(x˜s, u˜s), s ∈ S ′12}. Because of
the minimum up time constraints, we can only append a one to x˜s, a zero to u˜s, and
a zero to w˜s. We set λs = µs, ∀s ∈ S ′12.
• Construct two integral points (xˆs1, uˆs1), (xˆs2, uˆs2) from each {(x˜s, u˜s), s ∈ S ′21}. We
create each start-up vector uˆs1 by appending a one to u˜s, and each uˆs2 by appending
a zero. Each shut-down vector wˆs1, and wˆs2 can only be created by appending a zero
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to w˜s. Each commitment vector xˆs1 is created by appending a one to x˜s, and xˆs2 is
created by appending a zero. We set λs1+λs2 = µs, ∀s ∈ S ′21. Because
∑
s∈S′
21
µs ≥ uT ,
we can find λs1, λs2, s ∈ S ′21 such that
∑
s∈S′
21
λs1 = uT .
• Construct only one integral point (xˆs, uˆs) from each {(x˜s, u˜s), s ∈ S ′22}. Because of
the minimum down time constraints, we can only append a zero to x˜s, a zero to u˜s,
and a zero to w˜s. We set λs = µs, ∀s ∈ S ′22.
To summarize, we have constructed {(xˆs, uˆs), s ∈ S} = {(xˆs1, uˆs1), s ∈ S ′11}∪(xˆs2, uˆs2), s ∈
S ′11} ∪ {(xˆs, uˆs), s ∈ S ′12} ∪ {(xˆs1, uˆs1), s ∈ S ′21} ∪ {(xˆs2, uˆs2), s ∈ S ′21} ∪ {(xˆs, uˆs), s ∈ S ′22}
and their associated λ.
Finally, we verify (i), (ii), (iii) using the integral points and λs, s ∈ S that we have
constructed. Since we keep the first T − 1 components of each as to be the same as its
corresponding ps, by the way we construct λs, it suffices to verify (i), (ii), (iii) for only t = T .
(i). We have
∑
s∈S λ
s = 1. It suffices to show that xt =
∑
s∈S λ
sxˆsT , uT =
∑
s∈S λ
suˆsT .
By construction, we have
∑
s∈S λ
sxˆsT =
∑
s∈S′
11
λs2+
∑
s∈S′
12
λs+
∑
s∈S′
21
λs1 = xT−1−
wT + uT = xt.
Also, we have
∑
s∈S λ
suˆsT =
∑
s∈S′
21
λs1 = uT .
(ii). By construction, we have
∑
s∈ST,d
λs =
∑
s∈S′
11
λs1 = wT .
(iii). By construction, we have
∑
s∈ST,u
λs =
∑
s∈S′
21
λs1 = uT .
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